



QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW:

I. Whether individual members of the local Bar Committee or of the Missouri State Board of Law Examiners, who willingly conspire with private attorneys to discredit the reputation of, and maliciously attach the stigma of "moral unfitness" to a law student before that law student's Application For Law Student Registration is properly before said Bar Committee or said Board of Law Examiners, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from civil damages in connection with a cause of action brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983?

II. Whether it is appropriate for the District Court to deny the plaintiff in a Section 1983 civil rights suit, alleging a secret conspiracy, the right to conduct any discovery and then grant the

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether individual members of the Board of Directors of the National Labor Relations Board are entitled to the same protection against self-incrimination as the corporation itself, and whether the corporation is entitled to the same protection against self-incrimination as its individual members. The Supreme Court in *Upjohn Co. v. United States*, 449 U.S. 434 (1981), held that the corporation is entitled to the same protection against self-incrimination as its individual members. The Court stated that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination is a personal right that belongs to the individual, not to the corporation. Therefore, the corporation is not entitled to the same protection against self-incrimination as its individual members.

II. Whether it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to grant the petition in a case involving the right to privacy. The Supreme Court has granted the petition in a case involving the right to privacy. The Court stated that the right to privacy is a fundamental right that is protected by the Constitution. Therefore, the Court granted the petition.

defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment based on the plaintiff's lack of factual evidence to withstand the motions?

III. Whether the plaintiff in a Section 1983 civil rights conspiracy suit can reasonably be expected at the initial pleading stage to allege facts with sufficient specificity to "show a meeting of the minds"?

IV. Whether, in a Section 1983 civil rights conspiracy suit, affidavits submitted by the defendants, and directly disputed in the plaintiff's opposing affidavits, which simply deny any knowledge of facts alleged by the plaintiff are sufficient to meet the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact?

defendants' Motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's lack of factual evidence in support of the motion.

III. Whether the plaintiff is a section 1983 civil rights conspiracy and can reasonably be expected at the time pleading stage to allege facts with sufficient specificity to show a violation of the statute?

IV. Whether in a section 1983 civil rights conspiracy and whether defendant of the defendants, and thereby exposed to the plaintiff's resulting damages, which may show any knowledge of facts alleged or the plaintiff has indicated in such the failure of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact.

V. Whether the plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 civil rights conspiracy suit is legally required to seek a remedy in the state court system prior to bringing a cause of action in the federal court system under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983?

VI. Whether, under the facts and circumstances alleged in petitioner's pleadings and affidavits, a fair-minded jury could possibly return a verdict in favor of petitioner?

VII. Whether, under the facts and circumstances alleged in petitioner's pleadings and affidavits, the District Court clearly abused its discretion when it imposed FRCP Rule 11 sanctions upon petitioner?

Y. Whether the material bearing a
section 1001 civil rights conspiracy and
is being required to seek a remedy in
the state court system prior to bringing
a suit of action in the federal court
system under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

VI. Whether under the state and
federal laws alleged in defendant's
petition and affidavit, a federal court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the
cause of action.

VII. Whether under the facts and
circumstances alleged in defendant's
petition and affidavit, the federal
court should exercise its jurisdiction over
the cause of action.

Respectfully,
[Signature]

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**LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CASE NO.
90-1477WM ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CASE NO. 90-4020-CV-C-5**

Donald K. Alexander, Petitioner,

V.

Evans & Dixon Law Partnership, Richard
K. Andrews, Gerre S. Langton, David
P. Macoubrie, John L. Oliver, Jr.,
Lori J. Levine, Loramel P. Shurtleff,
Thomas M. Dunlap, Bruce Beckett,
Betty K. Wilson, and Nancy Galloway,
Respondents.

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**OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS:**

There are not, to petitioner's knowledge, any official or unofficial reports of the District Court's opinion or of the "affirmed per curium" opinion of the three-judge panel in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

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CITIZEN AND
NATIONALITY

There are two questions
involved, one of which is
regarding the United States' opinion as
of the defendant's country of origin at
the time he was found in the United
States. The other is regarding

**GROUND ON WHICH THE
JURISDICTION OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT IS INVOKED:**

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (case number 90-1477 WM) summarily affirmed the District Court and assessed additional damages plus double costs against petitioner in an unpublished opinion filed and entered on October 11, 1990. Petitioner did not file for a rehearing due to the "per curiam" affirmation and the threat of yet additional sanctions, and because the Eighth Circuit made no reference whatsoever to the points of law and legal theories relied upon by petitioner in his original brief and reply brief.

28 U.S.C. Section 1254 confers jurisdiction upon the United States

GRAND JURY WHICH THE
JURISDICTION OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT IS INVOLVED

The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit (Case
number 10,171) was recently affirmed
the District Court and dismissed
without prejudice from further
consideration by the respondent
petitioner and entered an order in
1961. The Court did not file a
written opinion for the petitioner
of course and the District Court
affirmed without comment and because the
petitioner made no objection
to the order in the petition for writ of
habeas corpus and the petition for
writ of certiorari and writ of
habeas corpus and writ of certiorari

U.S.C. Section 1254
Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court to review the judgment of a Circuit Court of Appeals in any civil or criminal case by granting a petition for a writ of certiorari to the circuit rendering the judgment. The Eighth Circuit has rendered a decision in conflict with the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit opinions on the same matter and has so far sanctioned a departure by the District Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the United States Supreme Court's power of supervision. The decision here in question rendered by the Eighth Circuit is also in direct conflict with applicable decisions handed down in several majority opinions of the United States Supreme Court. Hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. Section

Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in *Whitney v. 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4775, 4778, 4781, 4784, 4787, 4790, 4793, 4796, 4799, 4802, 4805, 4808, 4811, 4814, 4817, 4820, 4823, 4826, 4829, 4832, 4835, 4838, 4841, 4844, 4847, 4850, 4853, 4856, 4859, 4862, 4865, 4868, 4871, 4874, 4877, 4880, 4883, 4886, 4889, 4892, 4895, 4898, 4901, 4904, 4907, 4910, 4913, 4916, 4919, 4922, 4925, 4928, 4931, 4934, 4937, 4940, 4943, 4946, 4949, 4952, 4955, 4958, 4961, 4964, 4967, 4970, 4973, 4976, 4979, 4982, 4985, 4988, 4991, 4994, 4997, 5000, 5003, 5006, 5009, 5012, 5015, 5018, 5021, 5024, 5027, 5030, 5033, 5036, 5039, 5042, 5045, 5048, 5051, 5054, 5057, 5060, 5063, 5066, 5069, 5072, 5075, 5078, 5081, 5084, 5087, 5090, 5093, 5096, 5099, 5102, 5105, 5108, 5111, 5114, 5117, 5120, 5123, 5126, 5129, 5132, 5135, 5138, 5141, 5144, 5147, 5150, 5153, 5156, 5159, 5162, 5165, 5168, 5171, 5174, 5177, 5180, 5183, 5186, 5189, 5192, 5195, 5198, 5201, 5204, 5207, 5210, 5213, 5216, 5219, 5222, 5225, 5228, 5231, 5234, 5237, 5240, 5243, 5246, 5249, 5252, 5255, 5258, 5261, 5264, 5267, 5270, 5273, 5276, 5279, 5282, 5285, 5288, 5291, 5294, 5297, 5300, 5303, 5306, 5309, 5312, 5315, 5318, 5321, 5324, 5327, 5330, 5333, 5336, 5339, 5342, 5345, 5348, 5351, 5354, 5357, 5360, 5363, 5366, 5369, 5372, 5375, 5378, 5381, 5384, 5387, 5390, 5393, 5396, 5399, 5402, 5405, 5408, 5411, 5414, 5417, 5420, 5423, 5426, 5429, 5432, 5435, 5438, 5441, 5444, 5447, 5450, 5453, 5456, 5459, 5462, 5465, 5468, 5471, 5474, 5477, 5480, 5483, 5486, 5489, 5492, 5495, 5498, 5501, 5504, 5507, 5510, 5513, 5516, 5519, 5522, 5525, 5528, 5531, 5534, 5537, 5540, 5543, 5546, 5549, 5552, 5555, 5558, 5561, 5564, 5567, 5570, 5573, 5576, 5579, 5582, 5585, 5588, 5591, 5594, 5597, 5600, 5603, 5606, 5609, 5612, 5615, 5618, 5621, 5624, 5627, 5630, 5633, 5636, 5639, 5642, 5645, 5648, 5651, 5654, 5657, 5660, 5663, 5666, 5669, 5672, 5675, 5678, 5681, 5684, 5687, 5690, 5693, 5696, 5699, 5702, 5705, 5708, 5711, 5714, 5717, 5720, 5723, 5726, 5729, 5732, 5735, 5738, 5741, 5744, 5747, 5750, 5753, 5756, 5759, 5762, 5765, 5768, 5771, 5774, 5777, 5780, 5783, 5786, 5789, 5792, 5795, 5798, 5801, 5804, 5807, 5810, 5813, 5816, 5819, 5822, 5825, 5828, 5831, 5834, 5837, 5840, 5843, 5846, 5849, 5852, 5855, 5858, 5861, 5864, 5867, 5870, 5873, 5876, 5879, 5882, 5885, 5888, 5891, 5894, 5897, 5900, 5903, 5906, 5909, 5912, 5915, 5918, 5921, 5924, 5927, 5930, 5933, 5936, 5939, 5942, 5945, 5948, 5951, 5954, 5957, 5960, 5963, 5966, 5969, 5972, 5975, 5978, 5981, 5984, 5987, 5990, 5993, 5996, 5999, 6002, 6005, 6008, 6011, 6014, 6017, 6020, 6023, 6026, 6029, 6032, 6035, 6038, 6041, 6044, 6047, 6050, 6053, 6056, 6059, 6062, 6065, 6068, 6071, 6074, 6077, 6080, 6083, 6086, 6089, 6092, 6095, 6098, 6101, 6104, 6107, 6110, 6113, 6116, 6119, 6122, 6125, 6128, 6131, 6134, 6137, 6140, 6143, 6146, 6149, 6152, 6155, 6158, 6161, 6164, 6167, 6170, 6173, 6176, 6179, 6182, 6185, 6188, 6191, 6194, 6197, 6200, 6203, 6206, 6209, 6212, 6215, 6218, 6221, 6224, 6227, 6230, 6233, 6236, 6239, 6242, 6245, 6248, 6251, 6254, 6257, 6260, 6263, 6266, 6269, 6272, 6275, 6278, 6281, 6284, 6287, 6290, 6293, 6296, 6299, 6302, 6305, 6308, 6311, 6314, 6317, 6320, 6323, 6326, 6329, 6332, 6335, 6338, 6341, 6344, 6347, 6350, 6353, 6356, 6359, 6362, 6365, 6368, 6371, 6374, 6377, 6380, 6383, 6386, 6389, 6392, 6395, 6398, 6401, 6404, 6407, 6410, 6413, 6416, 6419, 6422, 6425, 6428, 6431, 6434, 6437, 6440, 6443, 6446, 6449, 6452, 6455, 6458, 6461, 6464, 6467

1254 is especially appropriate in the instant case.

**CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS
WHICH THE CASE
INVOLVES:**

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 56(c) (Summary Judgment)

"Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in

1934 is especially appropriate in the

present case.

CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS
WHICH THE CASE
INVOLVES.

Relevant Rules of Civil Procedure

Relevant Rules of Criminal Procedure

"Motion and Response" provisions.
The motion shall be served at least
in days before the time fixed for
the hearing. The motion shall
state the facts of the case and
the grounds therefor. The
respondent shall be served with
the motion at least five days
before the hearing. The
respondent shall file a response
to the motion at least three
days before the hearing. The
court shall hear the motion
and make its decision. The
court shall also hear the
evidence and make its decision
on the merits of the case. A
judgment shall be entered in
accordance with the decision of the
court.

character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 11

"Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions. Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is

well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee."

Constitution of the United States:

Amendment I

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably

well presented in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good
legal argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing
law and fact is not introduced
for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation. It is a pleading.
Action or other papers is not
allowed. It must be signed under
it is signed generally after the
motion is added to the affidavit of
the plaintiff or moved. It is a
pleading. Action or other paper is
signed to the effect of this rule the
court upon motion or upon the day
thereof shall report upon the
person who signed it, a representation
made by both or appropriate
motion which may include an
order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion or
other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.

Amendment to the United States

Amendment I

"Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people, peaceable

to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

Amendment V

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor will any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Amendment XIV, Section 1

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

to receive and to petition the
Government for a redress of
grievances.

Amendment V

"No person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous
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which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

**STATEMENT OF THE
CASE:**

Petitioner, Donald K. Alexander, appellant and plaintiff below, is a fifty year old law student at the University of Missouri-Columbia and is scheduled to complete his law degree in December, 1990. Alexander filed a civil rights conspiracy suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in the United States District Court For the Western District of Missouri (case number 90-4002-CV-C-5) alleging that respondents secretly conspired individually and with each other to violate his rights to free speech, due process of law and equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution.

the President the equal protection
of the law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

William, Donald & Alexander
... and ... in a ...
... at the University of
... in ...
... in ...
... that a ...
... under ...
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... of ...
... (V-1) ...
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... with ...
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... the ...

John ...

Respondents, Gerre S. Langton, Richard K. Andrews, David P. Macoubrie, John L. Oliver, Jr., and Lori J. Levine, appellees and defendants below (hereinafter referred to as "board members"), are current or former members of the Missouri State Board of Law Examiners. Respondent, Gerre S. Langton, is also a senior partner at Evans & Dixon Law Partnership.

Respondents, Loramel P. Shurtleff, Thomas M. Dunlap, Bruce Beckett, Betty K. Wilson, and Nancy Galloway, appellees and defendants below (hereinafter referred to as "Bar Committee members"), are current or former members of the Missouri Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee.

Respondents, Carter S. Jackson,
Edward K. Andrews, David E.
Mason, John L. Oliver, Jr., and
last but not least, respondents and defendants
below (hereinafter referred to as "parties")
are current or former
members of the Missouri State Board of
Law Examiners. Respondent, Carter S.
Jackson, is also a senior partner at
Knox & Dixon law partnership.

Respondents, James W. Shattuck,
James W. Shattuck, James W. Shattuck, Jr.,
J. Wilson, and Henry Galloway,
respondents and defendants below
(hereinafter referred to as "parties")
are current or
former members of the Missouri
Bar Association. Respondent, James W.
Shattuck, is also a senior partner at
Knox & Dixon law partnership.

Respondent, Evans & Dixon,
appellee and defendant below
(hereinafter referred to as
"Evans & Dixon"), is a Missouri Law
Partnership.

Alexander alleges that four
attorneys from Evans & Dixon, Laura B.
Aller, Brian N. Brink, Adrian P.
Sulser, and Henry D. Menghini, who
served as opposing counsel in defending
against Alexander's pro se lawsuit
against AAIM Management Association
(civil action 582665, Circuit Court of
St. Louis County; civil action 892-1895
on change of venue, Circuit Court For
the City of St. Louis) acted individually
and in conspiracy with each other to
deprive him of due process of law and
equal protection of the laws by
knowingly and intentionally engaging in
multiple breaches of the ABA Model

Rules of Professional Conduct as a means of depriving Alexander of the equal protection of the laws afforded to pro se litigants under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and further depriving Alexander of due process of law mandated under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Specifically, Alexander alleges that said four attorneys from Evans & Dixon backdated by twenty-seven (27) days a critical motion for a protective order filed in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis; that the backdated motion was supported by a false affidavit which they filed in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, that, in further support of the false affidavit and backdated motion, they made knowing and intentional false

Index of Professional Conduct as a member
of the Engineering Association of the State
of California. The laws of the State
relating to the Engineering profession
in the United States
and various countries
of the world
and the laws of the State
of California relating to the
Engineering profession.

Engineering, Electrical, Mechanical, Civil,
and other branches of the Engineering profession
as practiced in the United States and
in the various countries of the world.
The laws of the State of California
relating to the Engineering profession
and the laws of the various countries
of the world relating to the
Engineering profession.
The laws of the State of California
relating to the Engineering profession
and the laws of the various countries
of the world relating to the
Engineering profession.

statements during oral arguments before said Circuit Courts; that, in further support of the false affidavit and backdated motion, they knowingly and intentionally filed false pleadings in said Circuit Courts; that, through the repeated, improper use of personal influence, they illegally influenced judges in the Circuit Court For the City of St. Louis to transfer Alexander's legal claim into the Equity Division for a juryless trial, and then to move Alexander's case forward on the equity docket while Alexander was seeking relief by means of a Writ of Mandamus.

Alexander challenged these alleged overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy on the part of Evans & Dixon by speaking and writing in public forums at the University of Missouri Law School

statements during oral arguments before
and Circuit Courts. That in further
support of the fact that the
testimony of the witnesses is
inherently true and that the
Circuit Court is not through the
testimony of the witnesses of personal
influence, they directly influenced
judges on the Circuit Court for the City
of St. Louis to transfer the case to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis
and that the case was not
transferred to the Circuit Court for the City
of St. Louis until after the case was
transferred to the Circuit Court for the City
of St. Louis. The case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis
after the case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis.
The case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis
after the case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis.
The case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis
after the case was transferred to the
Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis.

campus and during interrogation by the Bar Committee members, in addition to filing written complaints in the said Circuit Courts, the Missouri Court of Appeals For the Eastern District and the Missouri Supreme Court.

Alexander further alleges that Evans & Dixon, acting through Gerre S. Langton (who personally reviewed Alexander's said Writ of Mandamus at the request of Henry D. Menghini), and with full knowledge of Alexander's status as a law student, conspired with the Bar Committee members and the other board members to silence, oppress, threaten, injure and intimidate him for the sole purpose of retribution against him for his attempts to expose the civil rights conspiracy being perpetrated upon him by Evans & Dixon.

Alexander further alleges that Evans & Dixon, acting through Gerre S. Langton, reached a meeting of the minds with the Bar Committee members and the other board members to hinder, delay, and eventually reject his Application For Law Student Registration, as overt acts solely in furtherance of the conspiracy, before said application was received, formally reviewed, processed or acted upon by either the Missouri Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee or the Missouri State Board of Law Examiners.

During the process of answering detailed questions on said application and during his interrogation by the committee members, Alexander disclosed information about his private, personal life over the prior thirty-six (36) years. Alexander stated that he divorced his first wife in

1964 when he caught her having sex with another man, and that the man attacked Alexander such that a fight erupted. Alexander was arrested and charged with assault and the charge was thereafter dropped. Alexander further stated that in 1982, he was forced into bankruptcy when his sub-chapter S corporation became insolvent due to the refusal of a customer to pay for a 12,800 square foot warehouse which Alexander was erecting for the customer on Alexander's credit. Twelve (12) years earlier, Alexander had also filed personal bankruptcy upon the dissolution of his second marriage caused by his second wife deserting Alexander and their three-year old son in order to live with another man. Alexander agreed to give his second wife all their marital assets in exchange for sole custody of

1964 when he caught her having sex
with another man, and that the man
attended Alexander's cell and a fight
ensued. Alexander was arrested and
charged with assault and the charge was
later dropped. Alexander further
stated that in 1965 he was forced into
prostitution when his subordinates
a corporation named "Franklin" took the
the return of a suitcase to pay for a
\$1,500 ransom for weapons which
Alexander was creating for the customer
on the ship's return. (12)
James Barker, Alexander's first wife, filed
for divorce from Alexander upon the dissolution
of his second marriage caused by his
conduct with Alexander's daughter and
their three children was in order to live
with Barker and Alexander agreed to
give the money with all their assets
except in exchange for the custody of

their son. Alexander left the marriage with zero assets.

Alexander further stated that he married again in 1971 but his new wife could not deal with his small son and became hooked on prescription drugs such that this marriage also dissolved; that while this marriage was breaking up, he became involved in a dispute with Laclede Gas Company over unmetered gas charges which he claimed were arbitrary and unreasonable. While Alexander was out of town, Laclede Gas locked out Alexander's meter. Alexander returned home on the week-end and cut the lock off his meter in order to have gas service over the week-end. The dispute escalated and Laclede Gas charged Alexander with "tampering with a utility meter." Alexander was thereafter

their son. Alexander left the marriage

with their assets.

Alexander further stated that he married again in 1977 but his new wife could not deal with the small son and became involved in psychiatric drugs such that this marriage also deteriorated. That while this marriage was breaking up, he became involved in a dispute with Jackson Lee Company over retained gas charges which he claimed were arbitrary and unreasonable. While Alexander was out of town, Jackson Lee looked out Alexander's meter. Alexander returned from the apartment and out the back of the meter in order to have gas service over the weekend. The dispute continued and Jackson Lee charged Alexander with tampering with a utility meter. Alexander was thereafter

arrested but the charge was dismissed as unfounded. In addition, Alexander was charged with the theft of his own construction materials during the dispute over the unpaid construction invoices wherein Alexander closed down the construction job site and removed construction materials paid for by Alexander. This criminal charge was dropped following a review of the relevant facts.

Alexander further stated that he had been involved in several pro se civil lawsuits because the amount of value in controversy did not justify the usual legal fees demanded by attorneys.

In response to application questions requiring specific details concerning any and all prior traffic violations, Alexander

stated that the charge was dismissed as unfounded. In addition, Alexander was charged with the theft of his own property. Alexander stated during the trial that the report concerning his involvement was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded.

Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded.

In response to questions during the trial, Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded. Alexander stated that he was not involved in the matter and that the report was unfounded.

stated that he had received several minor traffic tickets over the previous thirty-four (34) years, but the specific details of time, place, amount of fine, court dates, etc. had long since been forgotten. Records concerning traffic violations in Missouri are purged every five years such that Alexander had no way of tracing the history of such minor traffic violations.

Then, in response to application questions requiring a complete history of all prior employments, Alexander disclosed every job which he held during the previous thirty-four (34) years including moonlighting jobs, summer jobs, and part-time jobs during high school and college years.

Alexander alleges that the committee members and the board members ignored the substance of Alexander's application answers and paraphrased Alexander's responses in the worst possible language in order to come up with some reason to reject Alexander's application in accordance with the prior meeting of the minds between the alleged co-conspirators before Alexander's application was actually received, reviewed or formally processed.

Following the actual processing and eventual rejection of Alexander's said application, he filed suit in the District Court for civil damages under the authority of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Immediately after filing suit in the District Court, Alexander sought

... Alexander always that the Council
members and the Board members ignored
the substance of Alexander's resignation
and continued to pay him a salary
in the name of the West Virginia
Institute of Science up to the time he
left the country's jurisdiction. In
accordance with the provisions of the
State of West Virginia, the
unemployment benefits Alexander's
application was actually reviewed
and finally granted.

... for actual knowledge and
without the request of Alexander's wife
... the fact that the
Court in this matter under the
provisions of the State of West Virginia.

... Alexander's wife to the
... Alexander's wife

evidence through timely discovery in the form of interrogatories, request for production of documents, request for admissions, and numerous scheduled depositions. The respondents filed affidavits simply denying any knowledge of the conspiracy alleged by Alexander, along with motions to stay discovery, motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions for sanctions under FRCP Rule 11. Alexander filed rebuttal affidavits and opposing suggestions to all of respondents' motions. In addition, Alexander filed his Amended Petition in affidavit form to rebut statements of denial by the various respondents. The District Court denied Alexander's timely motion to further amend his petition.

The District Court stayed all of Alexander's attempted discovery and summarily dismissed Alexander's complaint. The District Court stated that its decision was based on: (1) lack of factual evidence to defeat respondents' motions for summary judgment, (2) lack of specific factual allegations to show a meeting of the minds, (3) failure to exhaust available state remedies, and (4) quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the bar committee members and the board members. In addition, the District Court imposed Rule 11 sanctions upon Alexander in the amount of \$8,200.00.

Alexander filed a timely appeal to the Eighth Circuit which the Eighth Circuit summarily rejected in a "per curium" affirmation of the District

Court's opinion without any reference to the points of law raised in Alexander's briefs. The Eighth Circuit imposed additional damages plus double costs upon Alexander.

REASONS RELIED ON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT:

The most compelling reasons for granting Alexander's petition are grounded in rights guaranteed under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The First Amendment protects Alexander's right to publicly speak out against perceived malfeasance on the part of individuals clothed with the public trust without fear of illegal retribution perpetuated by lawyers, judges, and administrative officials. Alexander's

Court's opinion without any reference to
the points at issue raised in Alexander's
briefs. The Fifth Circuit imposed
additional expenses upon double costs
upon Alexander.

REASONABLE RELIANCE ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE WEST

The most important reasons for
granting Alexander's petition are
grounded in the fact that under the
first, fifth and sixth amendments
to the United States Constitution the
first Amendment provides Alexander's
right to publish news and report
investigative matters on the part of
citizens engaged with the public good
without fear of legal retaliation
retaliated by lawyers, judges and
administrative officials Alexander's

complaint alleges that he did so speak out and that as a direct result of this exercise of constitutional rights he suffered illegal retribution and substantial pecuniary damages by means of an illegal civil conspiracy involving lawyers, judges, and administrative officials.

It is patently clear that Alexander filed a "colorable claim" in his amended petition filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri and is therefore entitled under "due process" to a fair and impartial jury trial.

Alexander, in his amended complaint, presents over twenty (20) pages of chronological narrative in order to show the underlying motive for the

example of a case that he did so speak
out and that as a direct result of this
exercise of constitutional rights he
suffered illegal repression and
substantial pecuniary damage by means
of an illegal civil conspiracy involving
judicial, legislative and administrative
officials.

It is noteworthy that the respondents
find a "credible claim" in the amended
petition filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri and in response thereto under
"due process" in a civil and equitable
case filed.

Accordingly, in the amended
petition, respondents seek twenty (20)
pages of chronological narrative in order
to save the underlying matter for the

alleged conspiracy, the names of each conspirator, the objective of the conspiracy, the undeniable nexus between the named conspirators, the opportunity presented for the conspirators to achieve their illegal objective, the means by which the illegal objective was communicated to other willing conspirators, the achievement of the illegal objective, and the resulting permanent deprivation of Alexander's constitutional rights along with irreversible pecuniary damages. Alexander further points out how the conspiracy was carried out under color of law in the absence of the shield of judicial immunity.

Under the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Alexander is entitled to have the same

constitutional, statutory, administrative, and case law applied to him as has been applied to others "similarly situated," including procedural law governing pre-trial motions and judgments on the pleadings. Discrimination against Alexander because he is bringing a very unpopular lawsuit against politically powerful opponents, and because he is appearing pro se is also prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is repugnant to the United States Constitution as well as to the average citizen's common sense expectation of equal justice and fair play that the District Court should be allowed to summarily dismiss Alexander's claim by a decision on disputed facts which fall within the province of the jury in

constituted, executive, administrative,
and now has applied to him as has been
applied to others "absolute authority."
Indubitably, however, the Government
has been unable and indignant as the
situation. Unquestionably, against
American business he is holding a very
unpopular issue against political
personal opponents, and because he is
opposed, not as is also indicated
under the President's Administration, it is
evident in the latter case
the President as well as the people
have a strong sense of responsibility
and the fact that the
President's chief interest in the
American people is to bring about a
change in the Government of the United States.

connection with the District Court's rulings on procedural issues raised in pre-trial motions.

All of the grounds (previously cited) stated by the District Court as the basis for dismissing Alexander's claim directly conflict with numerous majority opinions handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In addition, the legal reasoning, conclusions of law, and supporting dictum is in conflict with decisions rendered in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Moreover, the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions by the District Court, and again by the Eighth Circuit, to discourage further appeal by Alexander, is highly inappropriate under the relevant facts

and circumstances as alleged by Alexander.

Decisions among the circuits have not been in agreement concerning the scope of judicial immunity, and under what circumstances an alleged tortious act is entitled to immunity. The diverse opinions become more ambiguous when the challenged act or acts are attributed to persons claiming absolute quasi-judicial immunity by virtue of court delegated authority, duties and responsibilities.

The Fifth Circuit has adopted a four-part test to determine whether a particular act is judicial and entitled to immunity. *Brewer v. Blackwell*, 692 F.2d, 387, 396-97 (5th Cir. 1982) states,

and - - - - - as alleged by

the - - - - -

Doctors among the clergy have
not been in agreement concerning the
issue of human sexuality and their
what is considered an alleged violation
of the moral law. The efforts
of the Church to bring about a
greater understanding of the issue are
in progress. The efforts of the
Church to bring about a greater
understanding of the issue are
in progress. The efforts of the
Church to bring about a greater
understanding of the issue are
in progress.

The issue of human sexuality
is a complex one and one which
has been the subject of much
debate. The issue of human
sexuality is a complex one and
one which has been the subject
of much debate. The issue of
human sexuality is a complex one
and one which has been the
subject of much debate.

"We inquire in determining the judicial nature of an act whether (1) the act complained of is a normal judicial function, (2) the events occurred in the judge's court or chambers, (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge, and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity."

The Seventh Circuit is less inclined to grant immunity to challenged acts committed in close relationship to a biased decision. In *Lopez v. Vanderwater*, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235-37 (7th Cir. 1980), the circuit held that a judge's private prior agreement to decide in favor of one party is not a judicial act. In *Harper v. Merckle*, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th Cir. 1981), the court said,

"Succinctly, we hold only that when it is beyond reasonable dispute that a judge has acted out of personal motivation and has used his judicial office as an offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives, and it

no dispute in determining the
judicial nature of an act whether
(1) the act complained of is a
normal judicial function, (2) the
events connected with the judge's
conduct are, however, (3) the
controversy centered around a ques-
tion pending before the judge and
(4) the controversy arose directly
and immediately out of a trial in the
judge in his official capacity.

The Seventh Circuit is now inclined
to stand essentially in unchanged
position in these respects. In a
recent decision, *United States v. [Name]*,
120 F.2d 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Accordingly, we hold that when
a party has sought and obtained
an order for the production of
documents and has used his
discretion in the manner
of production, and if
the production is not
unreasonable, we will
not disturb it.

further appears certain that no party has invoked the judicial machinery for any purpose at all, then the judge's actions do not amount to judicial acts. These nonjudicial acts, to state the obvious, are not cloaked with judicial immunity from suit under Section 1983."

The Ninth Circuit, prior to 1986, was even less tolerant than the Seventh Circuit, but overruled *Ronkin v. Howard* 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) in 793 F.2d 1078 (1986) and now the circuit extends very broad judicial immunity. However, the Seventh Circuit's guidelines are most similar to decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In *Hoover v. Ronwin*, 466 U.S. 558, 559 (1984), in a four to three decision, the court held the challenged action to be the action of the state and hence shielded by immunity. But, at p. 569, the majority opinion stated,

"...the first critical step in our analysis must be to determine whether the conduct challenged is that of the court."

In the strong dissenting opinion at p. 587, Justice Stevens said,

"...respondent does not challenge any state policy. He contests neither the decision to license those who wish to practice law, nor the decision to require a certain level of competence, as measured in a bar examination, as a pre-condition to licensing. Instead, he challenges an alleged decision to exclude even competent attorneys from practice in Arizona in order to protect the interest of the Arizona Bar."

Justice Stevens further stated at p. 591-92,

"Here, no decision of the sovereign, the Arizona Supreme Court, is attacked; only a conspiracy of petitioners which was neither compelled nor directed by the sovereign is at stake."

The first critical step in our
analysis must be to determine
whether the student challenged is
that of the court.

In the second, determining whether
the student is a student.

...consequently there are two steps
any case. The first is to
determine the student is a student
who is not a student but who
desires to receive a certain level
of education as compared to a
bar examination, as a condition
of licensing. In this case
challenged as a student desiring to
receive a certain level of education
from someone in a position to grant it
under the terms of the statute.

Under these facts, the student is
a student.

...the court is in a position to
determine the student is a student
who is not a student but who
desires to receive a certain level
of education as compared to a
bar examination, as a condition
of licensing.

Then at p. 593, Justice Stevens said,

"Thus, if the Supreme Court did not itself deny Ronwin's application, if the denial of Ronwin's petition for review is irrelevant, and the only criterion it ever required petitioners to employ was competence, it is difficult to see why petitioners should have immunity from the requirements of federal law if, as alleged, they took the initiative in employing a criterion other than competence."

Justice Stevens' strong dissent indicates that alleged quasi-judicial acts, even when such acts are directly and immediately performed in connection with matters timely and properly before the persons carrying out the quasi-judicial function, may be considered as acts not required by the delegating court and therefore not shielded by immunity.

Furthermore, in *Forrester v. White*,
484 U.S. 219 (1988), the majority opinion
stated,

"Here, as in other contexts,
immunity is justified and defined by
the function it protects and serves,
not by the person to whom it
attaches." p. 227.

Then, at p. 228, the majority opinion
states,

"Administrative decisions, even
though they may be essential to the
very functioning of the courts,
have not similarly been regarded as
judicial acts."

Finally, at p. 230, the majority opinion
left no remaining doubt that judicial
immunity is to be applied narrowly and
with great caution,

"Absolute immunity is strong
medicine, justified only when the

Washington, D.C. February 1, 1960

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sir:

I am writing to you in regard to the information that has been received from the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the United States.

The information received from the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that the Soviet Union is engaged in a campaign of subversion and espionage in the United States.

The activities of the Soviet Union in the United States are of a serious nature and require the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I am sure that you will take the necessary steps to investigate and report on these activities.

I am sure that you will keep me informed of the progress of your investigation.

Very truly yours,
John F. Kennedy

danger of officials being deflected from the effective performance of their duties is very great...To conclude that, because a judge acts within the scope of his authority, such employment decisions are brought within the court's jurisdiction, or converted into judicial acts, would lift form above substance."

The four-part test laid down in *Brewer v. Blackwell*, *supra*, is essentially determination of facts rather than questions of law. In *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the court held,

"The factors determining whether an act by a judge is judicial relate to the nature of the act itself (whether it is a function normally performed by a judge) and the expectations of the parties (whether they dealt with the judge in his official capacity."

The holding in *Harper v. Merckle*,

number of officials being selected
from the executive personnel of
their duties is very great. In
consequence of this, however, a judge will
within the scope of his authority,
such important questions are
brought before the court's
attention, or conversely, the
judicial acts would be more
substantive.

The first part, that will have to
be done, is to establish
a certain relationship of these values
to the question of the
specimen, the U.S. and (1917), the
court held.

The feature is somewhat different
and not by a judge is found when
in the nature of the act itself
whether it is a question of a
government of a judge and, in
consequence of the nature of the
then dealt with the judge in the
official manner.

The finding in respect to the

supra, at p. 589 also requires fact finding rather than deciding questions of law.

Alexander alleges that because the bar committee members and the board members were conspiring with Evans & Dixon before his Application For Law Student Registration was formally being processed or acted upon by either the bar committee members or the board members, said individual members were not acting within judicially delegated authority, duties or responsibilities. This allegation is most certainly a question of fact and not a question of law, and is also a material and hotly disputed fact which a jury could reasonably decide in favor of Alexander.

Moreover, the "timing" question is a critical element and genuine issue of material fact relative to the defense of quasi-judicial immunity which respondents must plead and prove such that a fair-minded jury, upon due consideration of witness veracity and credibility, could resolve in favor of Alexander.

Alexander had filed discovery requests and scheduled numerous depositions at the earliest possible time in order to gain access to any possible evidence which the conspirators might have inadvertently overlooked. When the District Court ordered a stay against Alexander's discovery attempts, this order effectively erased any remaining chance that Alexander had to seek out incriminating evidence since all of Alexander's discovery was directed to

however, the "thing" question is a
rather slight and general issue of
method but relative to the degree of
detail required. Generally, the
requirements must find and prove the
fact, a knowledge of the facts, the
classification of the facts, and
the results. The results are of
three kinds.

1. The results are of three kinds.
The first kind is the results of the
facts, the second kind is the results
of the facts, and the third kind is
the results of the facts. The results
of the facts are of three kinds.
The first kind is the results of the
facts, the second kind is the results
of the facts, and the third kind is
the results of the facts. The results
of the facts are of three kinds.
The first kind is the results of the
facts, the second kind is the results
of the facts, and the third kind is
the results of the facts. The results
of the facts are of three kinds.

practicing attorneys and sitting judges. Such a stay by Judge Wright was highly inappropriate and extremely prejudicial to Alexander's cause of action.

In *Hickman v. Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 501, the United States Supreme Court held that the purpose of pleading is general notice-giving while the purpose of discovery is to:

"narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and to ascertain the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of the facts, relative to those issues."

In *Kraemer v. Grant County*, No. 88-3519, Slip Opinion, (7th Cir. 1990), the circuit states,

"It may on occasion take the power of the federal courts to keep state

practical attorney and public defender
and a man of high integrity and
highly respected in the community
for his services to the community.

In January, 1961, the
1961, 1962, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the government is not
to be treated as a private citizen with
the same rights as a private citizen.

The Court ruled that the government
is not to be treated as a private citizen
and that the government is not to be
treated as a private citizen.

The Court ruled that the government
is not to be treated as a private citizen
and that the government is not to be
treated as a private citizen.

The Court ruled that the government
is not to be treated as a private citizen
and that the government is not to be
treated as a private citizen.

officials from harassing unpopular
and powerless citizens."

In *Adickes v. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S.
144 (1970), Justice Black, concurring in
the opinion at p. 175 said,

"Summary judgments may be
granted only when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact..."

In *First National Bank v. Cities
Service*, 391 U.S. 244, 293 (1968), the
majority opinion stated that in the
ordinary conspiracy case the plaintiff
would be entitled to obtain discovery
against all the alleged conspirators.
Additionally, in *Polier v. Columbia*

Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1962), the majority opinion held that summary judgment should be used sparingly where motive and intent play leading roles and proof of the conspiracy is largely controlled by the alleged conspirators; that credibility and weight can only be evaluated when witnesses are present and subject to cross examination; that when the sole answer is that there is not sufficient evidence to support plaintiff's allegations, the issue remains a question of fact; that trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury; and that discovery is a factor to be considered in deciding a summary judgment motion.

In United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 854 (7th Cir. 1988), the court stated,

RECEIVED: THE U.S. MAR. 23, 1911

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

SUBJECT: BUREAU OF LANDS

TO: THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

RE: A certain tract of land in the

State of California, to-wit:

Section 36, Township 12N, Range 12E, S. 1

and 37, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 38, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 39, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 40, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 41, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 42, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 43, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 44, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 45, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 46, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 47, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 48, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 49, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

and 50, T. 12N., R. 12E., S. 1

"Because conspiracies are carried out in secret, direct proof of agreement is rare."

The First Circuit also recognizes the secret nature of conspiracies and the resulting scarcity of incriminating evidence. In *Earle v. Benoit*, 850 F.2d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1988), the First Circuit said,

"To be sure, the agreement that rests at the heart of a conspiracy is seldom susceptible of direct proof; more often than not such an agreement must be inferred from all the circumstances."

Thus, to stay Alexander's early discovery attempts and force him to appeal his right to such discovery by appealing the granting of summary judgment against him is to ensure that Alexander will be unsuccessful if eventually granted access to discovery.

In *Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp.*,
321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944), the court
said,

"Rule 56 authorizes summary judgment only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, that no genuine issue remains for trial, and that the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right to trial by jury..."

Also, in *Adickes v. Kress, supra*, the majority opinion held that the moving party must foreclose reasonable possibilities in order to meet the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue with respect to summary judgment. Also at p. 159-60, the majority opinion stated,

"Respondent notes in this regard that none of the materials upon which petitioner relied met the requirements of Rule 56(e).

This argument does not withstand scrutiny, however, for both the commentary on and the background of the 1963 amendment conclusively show that it was not intended to modify the burden of the moving party under Rule 56(c) to show initially the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. The advisory committee notes on the amendment states that the changes were not designed to affect the ordinary standards applicable to summary judgment...the committee stated that where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented."

Viewed in light of these opinions, it is clear that Evans & Dixon, the Bar Committee members and the board members failed to carry the burden of the moving party under Rule 56(c).

In *Bourjaily v. United States*, 107 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 (1987), the majority opinion stated,

This document does not contain
any information, for both the
documentary and the historical
of the 1955 amendment conclusions
show that it was not intended to
modify the powers of the moving
party under Rule 20(c) to show
initially the absence of a genuine
issue concerning any disputed fact.
The advisory committee notes on the
amendment state that the changes
were not designed to affect the
advisory committee's jurisdiction to
decide that where the advisory
committee's support of the motion
does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment
may be denied even if no genuine
advisory matter is presented.

It is noted in light of these principles, it
is clear that Federal Rule 20(c) does not
authorize summary judgment in cases where
summary judgment is sought by the moving
party under Rule 20(c).

In *Boeing v. United States*, 354
U.S. 348, 77 S.Ct. 1233, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1363
(1957), the Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision, held that summary judgment

"...individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in accumulation prove it."

Earlier in *United States v. Diebold, Inc.*, 369 U.S. 654-55 (1962), the court held,

"On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion...A study of the record in this light leads us to believe that inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court might be permissible."

Alexander, in his Amended Complaint, alleges all the elements necessary to bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and alleges compelling circumstantial evidence in support of factual allegations. The District Court drew inferences from such circumstantial evidence in favor of the

Individual pieces of evidence
sufficient in themselves to prove a
point, say in identification cases
it.

Further in United States v. [Name]

the, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), the Court

held.

The primary purpose of the
evidence is to show that the
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt. It must be shown that the
evidence is relevant to the case.
The Court in this case held that
the evidence is relevant to the case
because it tends to show that the
defendant is guilty of the crime.

Relevant evidence is evidence

that tends to prove or disprove
a fact in issue. It is evidence
that is relevant to the case.
The Court in this case held that
the evidence is relevant to the case
because it tends to show that the
defendant is guilty of the crime.

moving parties when deciding the motions for summary judgments.

In *Hampton v. Hanrahan*, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit quoting from *Rotermund v. United States Corp.*, 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) laid down the elements of a civil conspiracy:

"A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages."

The circuit further stated at p. 621,

"In order to prove the existence of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is not required to provide direct evidence of the agreement between the conspirators; circumstantial

moving parties when deciding the motions
for summary judgment.

In *Hedgcock v. Hedgcock*, 600 F.2d
400, 420-21 (1st Cir. 1979), the Seventh
Circuit quoted from *Lawrence v.
United States Corp.*, 478 F.2d 1130 (5th
Cir. 1973), and stated the elements of a
valid summary judgment.

"A valid summary judgment is a determination
of fact or law made without a trial or
evidence to support an abstract and
or to conduct a hearing and by
reference to the pleadings and the
material of record. It is an admission
between the parties to admit a
truth or issue upon which and
no issue and that exists in
dispute."

The court further stated at p. 611.

"In order to prove the existence of
a valid summary judgment, a plaintiff is not
required to provide direct evidence
of the agreement between the
parties."

evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy Hoffman-Laroche, Inc.

v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971). Absent the testimony of a co-conspirator, it is unlikely that direct evidence of a conspiratorial agreement will exist. Thus, the question whether an agreement exists should not be taken from the jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can infer from the circumstances that the alleged conspirators had a meeting of the minds and thus reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objective. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59. A plaintiff seeking redress need not prove that each participant in a conspiracy knew the exact limits of the illegal plan or the identity of all the participants therein Hoffman-LaRoche, supra, 447 F.2d at 875. An express agreement among the conspirators is not a necessary element of a civil conspiracy...when the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to violate civil rights, the existence or non-existence of a conspiracy is essentially a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, should decide Adickes, supra, 398 U.S. at 176."

Respondent Richard K. Andrews' letter to Alexander dated December 27, 1989 (attached to original Complaint filed 1/3/90), is an angry and abusive letter

evidence may provide contrary
proof of
Hollman-Larson, Inc.
v. Greenberg, 347 F.2d 873, 875
(7th Cir., 1971).
testimony of a co-conspirator. It is
apparently that direct evidence of a
conspiratorial agreement will exist.
That the question whether an
agreement exists should not be
taken from the fact that a civil
conspiracy exists or that it is
a possibility that the law can infer
from the circumstances that the
alleged conspirators had a meeting
of the minds and have reached an
understanding to achieve the
conspiracy's objective. *Adkins v.
Green & Co.*, 382 U.S. 144, 148-49.
A plaintiff seeking relief need not
prove that each participant in a
conspiracy knew the exact details of
the illegal plan or the identity of all
the participants. *Id.*
Hollman-Larson, supra, 347 F.2d
at 875. An explicit agreement
among the conspirators is not a
necessary element of a civil
conspiracy, when the plaintiff
shows a conspiracy to violate their
rights. *Id.*
and evidence of a conspiracy is
sufficiently a federal crime that the
jury, not the trial judge, should
decide whether, supra, 347 F.2d at
875.

Respectfully,
[Signature]

Letter to [Name] dated December 11,

1971, enclosed is original [Name] and

1/27/72 is an entry and shows [Name]

on its face. Yet, Mr. Andrews' affidavit alleges that he had no knowledge or prior information whatsoever concerning Alexander at the time he reviewed Alexander's Application For Law Student Registration and acted upon it in his capacity as Secretary for the Missouri State Board of Law Examiners (Affidavit of Richard K. Andrews filed 2/15/90, p. 3-8). According to this sworn statement, Andrews had no information concerning Alexander other than that contained in Alexander's said application. Thus, under oath, Andrews claims that the decision by the board members to reject Alexander was based solely on the information contained in the application (attached to Andrews' affidavit filed 2/15/90). Yet, Andrews and the other board members admit their unjustified and predetermined bias against

On my way to the Mr. Andrews' office I
thought that he had no knowledge of
any information whatsoever concerning
Alexander of the fact as revealed
Andrews' Application for the Student
Registration and asked him if he
knew of anything for the Student
that might be the Student's father
at Andrew's house about 1910.
I said according to the
statement, Andrews said he had
contacted Alexander when that was
related to Andrews' and Alexander.
That under this, Andrews said he
was certain he was never present at
the Alexander and that he was in the
University apartment in the apartment
building at Andrews' house that
1910. The Andrews and the other
were never at the house
and furthermore, this

Alexander and their overt actions in furtherance of the conspiracy pushed by Evans & Dixon. As alleged reasons for depriving Alexander of the right to sit for the Missouri Bar Examination, the board members state,

"...it is entirely proper for the Board to consider such matters as the plaintiff's excessive and frivolous personal litigation, irresponsibility in business and fiscal matters, abuse of the bankruptcy process, lack of discretion, lack of self-restraint, lack of judgment, lack of objectivity, hypersensitivity, unwarranted suspicions, disrespect for the judicial process and the judicial system, inability to accept authority, tendencies to blame others and to ascribe evil motives to them, use of intemperate and provocative language and epithets, lack of civility, tendency to vilify others who have opposed him, delusions of self-importance, and more specifically, the plaintiff twice taking bankruptcy rather than attempting to pay his debts incurred by reason of his first divorce and an adverse \$23,000 judgment, the plaintiff's pursuit of unwarranted litigation in which plaintiff has appeared pro se and

has blamed the outcome on what he perceives to be the deceit of opposing lawyers and the corruption and complicity of judges, and the plaintiff's intemperately manifested disrespect for the lawyers who opposed him and the courts in which he appeared." (Suggestions in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, etc., filed 2/15/90, p. 11-12).

It would be totally impossible for a reasonable and fair-minded person to draw such inferences from the contents of Alexander's Application For Law Student Registration which Mr. Andrews swears under oath is the sole source of such inferences.

However, a reasonable and fair-minded jury could certainly infer from such a vicious attack upon Alexander that such anger and hostility pre-existed before Alexander's said application was ever received by the bar committee members or the board

has shown the evidence as well as
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It seems to me that the evidence
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members, and that such pre-existing anger and hostility resulted from a meeting of the minds with Evans & Dixon to heap retribution upon Alexander for attempting to expose the professional misconduct and illegal acts on the part of Evans & Dixon.

In *Welton v. Nix*, 719 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1983), the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the United States stating,

"In making this judgment the court made a choice of inferences to be drawn from the facts presented by both parties, a choice which is impermissible on a motion for summary judgment. *Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau*, 693 F.2d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 1982); *United States v. Diebold*, 369 U.S. 654 (1962). In *Diebold*, the Supreme Court held that a case is not suitable for summary judgment where there are undisputed facts from which different ultimate inferences might reasonably be drawn and as to

which reasonable persons might differ. 369 U.S. at 655, 82 S.Ct. at 994."

Alexander also stands on *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U.S. 167 wherein the majority opinion states,

"It is no answer that the state has a law which, if enforced, would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."

Alexander points out this unyielding law and the additional fact that Alexander is not seeking a reversal of the board members' denial of his right to sit for the Missouri Bar Examination or his right to practice law since his damages are irreversible and the State of Missouri cannot provide a remedy for his pecuniary damages. Alexander stated in his Amended Petition that he is only

which reasonable persons might
infer, 352 U.S. at 638, 13 S.Ct.
at 224.

Alexander also stands on Murray v.
Tape, 352 U.S. 157 where the majority
concluded that,

"It is not enough that the state has
a law which, if enforced, would
give relief. The federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first
sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked."

Alexander points out this regarding
law and the additional fact that
Alexander is not seeking a reversal of
the state court's denial of his right to
all the rights and remedies of
his right to practice law under the
state and provisions and the State of
Alabama cannot prevent a remedy for his
personal damages. Alexander stated in
the attached Exhibit that he is only

pursuing the "board hearing" in order to protect his "procedural record."

It was also inappropriate for the District Court to state that Alexander was legally bound to seek state administrative remedies prior to bringing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

Alexander has been severely prejudiced by the District Court's Order staying all of his discovery attempts to gather evidence of the alleged conspiracy through timely depositions and production of documents. After staying all of Alexander's attempts at discovery, the District Court dismissed Alexander's cause of action for lack of factual evidence to support his factual allegations. The District Court further

possessing the "best" feeling, in order to
to make the "best" feeling.

It was also suggested that the
District Court be asked to consider
the "best" feeling in order to make
administrative decisions prior to entering
a decree of divorce under 15-2-10.
Section 15-2-10

Alexander has been actively
proposed by the District Court's order
staying all of the divorce proceedings
other evidence of the alleged marriage
through their separation and
execution of documents. After showing
all of Alexander's attempts at divorce,
the District Court should consider Alexander's
case of action for nullity of marriage
and divorce in support of his
petition. The District Court is then
27

oppressed Alexander by imposing Rule 11 sanctions.

The case on point with Alexander's cause of action is *Kraemer v. Grant County, supra*. Lawton, attorney for Kraemer, was sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing what the District Court deemed to be a frivolous lawsuit. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated,

"In this case, our focus is on the reasonableness of Lawton's pre-filing research into the facts of the case. Although the District Court referred to Lawton's failure to establish a basis for the complaint in fact and in law, the legal problems drop out if his version of the facts was correct. If Sheriff Hottenstein was in fact conspiring with the Bakers to deprive Kraemer of her property, then there would be a remedy under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violation of Kraemer's civil rights. See *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). Absent the Sheriff's involvement, of course, there is no state action and no legal basis for a federal claim. But Kraemer's case

ultimately failed because she could not establish the necessary facts, not because the law did not provide a federal remedy for the wrongs she alleged in her complaint."

The court further stated,

"We cannot require an attorney to procure a confession of participation in a conspiracy from one of the prospective defendants before filing suit--if there were such a confession, no lawsuit would be necessary...Lawton had only two options; he could advise his client to give up, or he could file a complaint on her behalf and try to develop the necessary facts through discovery...No one else could be expected to have knowledge of the conspiracy. Until some other source of information became available, then, Lawton had to rely on his client for the factual foundation for the claim. There was simply no other source to which he could turn. Once Lawton was armed with the coercive power of the federal courts to enforce the rules of discovery, he was able to get telephone records showing frequent and lengthy conversations between the sheriff and the Bakers between May and June, 1986...If discovery is necessary to establish a claim, then it is not unreasonable to file a complaint so as to obtain the right to conduct that discovery."

In *Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Federation*, 836 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1987), the court held,

"Rule 11 must not bar the courthouse door to people who have some support for a complaint but need discovery to prove their case."

In *Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York*, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2nd Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit held that Rule 11 is violated only when it is,

"patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success."

Therefore it was inappropriate for the District Court to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Alexander under the facts and circumstances alleged in Alexander's pleadings.

184

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In conclusion, Alexander's cause of action is legally sound and far from frivolous. Alexander's chances of obtaining incriminating evidence of the alleged conspiracy by early discovery have been eliminated by the District Court's Order staying all of Alexander's discovery attempts. However, Evans & Dixon, the Bar Committee members and the board members have clearly failed to carry the burden imposed upon the moving party with respect to summary judgment. There are both disputed and undisputed facts for the jury to consider in this cause of action as pointed out in the foregoing argument. When all of the disputed facts are deemed resolved in favor of Alexander for the purpose of a judgment on the pleadings, Alexander is legally entitled to proceed to trial.

It is concluded, Alexander's case is
not a really novel and far from
ordinary Alexander's case of
showing manifesting evidence of the
alleged conspiracy by early testimony
have been obtained by the United
States' Order stating as it was, that
Alexander's case is a case of
showing the law Alexander's case and
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very the United States have been
moving party with regard to Alexander's
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Imposing Rule 11 sanctions against
Alexander was legally unreasonable.

Donald K. Alexander

Donald K. Alexander
Petitioner Pro Se
16-A Bdwy Village
Columbia, MO 65201
(314) 442-0319

Deposited July 15 1901

Alexander was legally responsible

Donald E. Alexander

Donald E. Alexander
Post Office
St. A. John
Columbia, MO 65201
(314) 444-0719

PROOF OF SERVICE:

Comes now petitioner, Donald K. Alexander, and affirms under oath before the undersigned notary public that he did on the 6th day of November, 1990, serve three copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari upon the attorney of record for each respondent by placing said copies in the U.S. mail with first class postage fully prepaid and said copies addressed to:


P. Pierce Dominique
623 E. McCarty St.
Jefferson City, MO 65101

Stephen C. Scott
1001 E. Walnut St.
Columbia, MO 65201

Bruce Farmer
P.O. Box 899
Jefferson City, MO 65102

STATE OF MISSOURI)
) SS.
COUNTY OF BOONE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me
on this 6th day of November, 1990.


Notary Public

My Commission Expires: September 24,
1994.

PROOF OF SERVICE

Come now petitioner, Donald F. Alexander, and others under oath before the undersigned notary public that he was on the 24th day of November, 1930, serve three copies of the foregoing petition for writ of Certiorari upon the attorney of record for each respondent by placing said copies in the U. S. mail with first class postage fully prepaid and said copies addressed to:

1. First Respondent
221 E. Second St.
Jefferson City, Mo. 64501

Stephen C. Smith
101 E. Second St.
Columbia, Mo. 65201

Briggs Towner
101 E. Second St.
Jefferson City, Mo. 64501

STATE OF MISSOURI

COUNTY OF BOONE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me
on this 24th day of November, 1930.

Donald F. Alexander
Notary Public

My Commission Expires September 14,
1934.

STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
STATE OF MISSOURI
ADDENDUM
Chapter 100

Letter from Richard K. Andrews to
Donald K. Alexander, dated December
27, 1989.

Relevant orders issued by the United
States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri.

Per curium opinion rendered by the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.

APPENDIX

Letter from Richard E. Anderson to
Donald A. Alexander, dated December
31, 1980.

Statement of the Board of Directors
of the American Bar Association
dated December 31, 1980.

For further information regarding the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.

**STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
STATE OF MISSOURI**

(Letterhead)

December 27, 1989

**Mr. Donald K. Alexander
16-A Broadway Village Drive
Columbia, MO 65201**

**Re: Donald K. Alexander; Law
Student Registration NO. 38933**

Dear Mr. Alexander:

Please be advised that the Board of Law Examiners has denied your Application for Law Student Registration because, in the opinion of the Board, you have failed to demonstrate that you possess the fitness and reliability required of applicants for registration as law students.

Although the Board's denial of your Application for Law Student Registration will not automatically preclude the Board from approving your application for admission to the Bar should you subsequently graduate from law school and make application for admission to the Bar, please be advised that the members of the Board would not be favorably disposed to recommending approval of your application for admission to the Bar.

STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS
STATE OF KENTUCKY

(Unofficial)

December 17, 1922

Mr. Donald H. Alexander
1024 Broadway Village Drive
Columbia, MO 65201

Mr. Donald H. Alexander, Esq.
Student Registration No. 28021

Dear Mr. Alexander:

Please be advised that the Board of
Law Examiners has denied your
Application for Law Student Registration
because, in the opinion of the Board,
you have failed to demonstrate that you
possess the fitness and capability
required of applicants for registration as
law students.

Although the Board's denial of your
Application for Law Student Registration
will not automatically preclude the Board
from approving your application for
admission to the Bar should you
subsequently graduate from law school
and make application for admission to the
Bar, please be advised that the members
of the Board would not be favorably
disposed to recommending approval of
your application for admission to the
Bar.

The matters contained in your Application for Law Student Registration reflect overwhelming evidence of your instability and inability to manage your personal affairs, including: three criminal prosecutions for assault, theft and tampering with a utility meter (all of which were dismissed); traffic violations so numerous that you did not list them; ten civil actions, in most of which you were the plaintiff and three of which are still pending; an unpaid judgment in excess of \$23,000 which you discharged by taking bankruptcy; two personal bankruptcies in 1970 and 1982; three divorces; and more than 25 different employments. One who has exhibited such a high degree of personal instability and inability to manage one's own affairs is ill-suited to counsel and represent others in the handling of their legal affairs.

While it is unusual for the Board to deny the filing of an Application for Law Student Registration, the Board believes it important in this instance to put you on notice that the Board considers you to be an unsuitable applicant for admission to the Bar and to advise you that the Board's present intent is to deny any application you may later make, upon graduation from law school, to take the bar examination.

The matter contained in your Application for Law Student Registration reflects outstanding evidence of your inability and inability to manage your personal affairs, including financial responsibilities for yourself, and the matter with a 20-25 meter fall in which were observed, with violations which were observed that you did not pay them; for each student in need of which you were the principal and that of which and with (pending) an unpaid judgment in excess of \$10,000 which you acknowledged by checkbook; the personal liabilities in 1970 and 1971; the income and those that is different significantly from what was expected; with this degree of personal responsibility and inability to manage and and also is involved in several and separate affairs in the conduct of your legal affairs.

While it is assumed for the Board to deny the issue of an admission to law school, registration, the Board believes it important to the Institute to not give an answer that the Board considers for in the an acceptable standard for admission to the law and to advise you that the Board's present intent is to deny your application and that you have been given a probationary period from the Board to take the necessary steps.

Mr. Donald K. Alexander
Page Two
December 27, 1989

Please be advised that, if you disagree with the action of the Board, you may have a hearing by the Board by serving a written request for a hearing upon the Secretary of the Board within 15 days after receipt of this letter. The written request for a hearing shall advise the Board of the matters desired to be covered at the hearing. You shall have the right to be represented by counsel and to present witnesses or other evidence at the time and place fixed by the Board for the hearing.

Very truly yours,

STATE BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS

Richard K. Andrews, Secretary
(Signature on Original
Retyped to conform
To Rule 33)

RKA/md

cc: Clerk of the Court
Members of the Board

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

DONALD K. ALEXANDER,)

Plaintiff,)

vs.)

90-4020-CV-C-5

EVANS & DIXON)

LAW FIRM et al.,)

Defendants.)

O R D E R

Before this Court are motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by two out of three groups of defendants in a civil rights suit against multiple defendants allegedly involved in the denial of plaintiff Donald K. Alexander's application for law student registration with the Missouri Supreme Court. One of the two motions requests in the alternative that this Court grant a motion for summary judgment. The defendants' motions also seek sanctions

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

HOWARD E. ALEXANDER

Plaintiff

vs.
EVANS & DIXON
Law Firm as well as
Defendants

Case No. 100-100-100

Before this Court are motions to
dismiss the bill of complaint and
to set aside the jury verdict of
\$100,000.00 in favor of the
defendants. The bill of complaint
alleges that the defendants
conspired to defraud the
plaintiff of his money. The
defendants deny the allegations
of the bill of complaint and
move for judgment on the merits.
The plaintiff moves for judgment
on the bill of complaint and
for an award of costs.

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Plaintiff Alexander alleges that members of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee, the law firm of Evans & Dixon, and members of the Missouri State Board of Law Examiners conspired together, in violation of his constitutional rights, to deny him the right to practice law. Plaintiff requests actual damages in the amount of \$2,505,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of \$5,010,000.00. In accordance with the reasoning below, this court states its intent to grant defendants' motions to dismiss, and in the alternative, grant defendant Evans & Dixon's motion for summary judgment. This court grants defendants' motions

for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff Alexander, and stays action on dismissal and summary judgment pending action on the Rule 11 sanctions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 8.07 charges the Missouri Board of Law Examiners ("Board"), with the assistance of the circuit bar committees, with the responsibility of investigating the moral character, fitness, and general qualifications of applicants for law student registration. Court Rule 8.04 is a prerequisite for taking the bar examination. The Board, with the investigative assistance of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee ("Committee"), denied plaintiff Donald K. Alexander's

("Mr. Alexander") application for law student registration by letter dated December 27, 1989.

The Board stated in its letter of denial that the information submitted by Mr. Alexander in his application evidenced "a high degree of personal instability and inability to manage [his] affairs" making him "ill-suited to counsel and represent others." The factors taken into consideration by the Board in its denial of Mr. Alexander's application were: (1) three criminal prosecutions against him for assault, theft, and tampering with a utility meter; (2) his numerous traffic violations; (3) his participation, usually as plaintiff, in ten civil actions, three of which are currently pending; (4) an unpaid judgment against him

Mr. Alexander's application for
for student registration is hereby
dated December 17, 1933.

The State Board of Education
of North Carolina has the honor to
submit to Mr. Alexander the
application submitted to it by him
for student registration and to
inform him that the same has been
approved by the Board and that
he is hereby registered as a
student in the State of North
Carolina. The Board has also
the honor to inform him that
the same has been forwarded to
the State Department of Education
for its consideration and that
it is the policy of the Board
to maintain the highest standards
of scholarship and to encourage
the advancement of the student
body of the State of North
Carolina.

of over \$23,000.00 which was discharged in bankruptcy; (5) two personal bankruptcies; (6) three divorces; and (7) more than twenty-five different employments.

The Board's letter of denial stated, in accordance with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 8.12, that if Mr. Alexander disagreed with the Board's action that he could request a hearing with the Board by serving a written request within fifteen (15) days of receipt of the letter of denial. Mr. Alexander by letter dated January 2, 1990 requested the hearing, but failed to submit the required supplementary information. Mr. Alexander filed the petition in this action on January 3, 1990 without having proceeded on his request for a hearing before the Board.

of over \$10,000,000 which was
distributed to beneficiaries (7) two
personal beneficiaries (8) three
directly, but (7) more than twenty
five different employees.

The Board's letter of denial
stated, in accordance with the
Federal Tax Court's ruling that it
was Alexander's property and the
Board's ruling that he could receive
a benefit with the Board he was
a witness against with the Board
(11) and of course of the Board
of appeal. Mr. Alexander is listed
as a beneficiary in the Board's
report but failed to receive his
reported benefit. The Board's
in this matter of the Board's 1980
annual report was reviewed and the
Board's 1980 annual report.

Mr. Alexander claims in his petition that the members of the Board conspired with the members of the Committee and with Defendant Evans & Dixon, a St. Louis law

(Note: this partial page has been inserted to correct typing errors of omission by petitioner.)

The following table is
given for the purpose of
showing the results of the
work done in the various
departments of the
Bureau of the Census for
the year 1900.

There were 1,111,111
persons in the United States
in 1900.

firm, to deprive him of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (1981) and 18 U.S.C. Section 241 (Supp. 1989). He claims that the conspiracy was motivated by his open criticism of "corruption and judicial bias."

Mr. Alexander further claims that the law firm Evans & Dixon participated in the conspiracy in retaliation for claims he had made against the firm in a separate prior action. The prior action, apparently pending in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, was brought by Mr. Alexander as a pro se plaintiff, with the law firm of Evans & Dixon representing the defendant. Mr. Alexander claims that in the prior suit Evans & Dixon submitted a false affidavit, lied, and committed numerous breaches of the code of legal ethics.

Mr. Alexander reasons that the law firm participated in the conspiracy in order to "'put plaintiff in his place' and demonstrate that no pro se plaintiff litigant can challenge a powerful and politically prominent law firm such as Evans & Dixon and be admitted to the Missouri Bar."

The stated cause of action in the case at bar is violation of Mr. Alexander's rights under the "due process clause" of the Fifth Amendment, his rights under the "other rights retained clause" of the Ninth Amendment, and his rights under the "equal protection of the laws clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Alexander seeks compensatory and punitive damages in the amounts stated above.

Defendant Evans & Dixon moves for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to show a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a claim of conspiracy. Evans & Dixon moves in the alternative for dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant members of the Committee move for dismissal based on their judicial immunity. Both Evans & Dixon and the members of the Committee move for dismissal based on insufficient factual allegations to support a claim upon which relief could be granted, and for recovery of their costs and reasonable attorneys' fee as authorized by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard for Dismissal and Summary Judgment

The general rule of law is that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957). Further the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1693 (1974), which in this case is Mr. Alexander. Therefore, in ruling on the motions for dismissal, this Court's construction of all allegations will be in favor of plaintiff Alexander.

Summary judgment can be granted only if there is no genuine dispute as to material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party has the burden of showing that there is

no genuine dispute as to material fact. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986).

B. Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2)

Defendant Evans & Dixon law firm has moved for summary judgment based on plaintiff Alexander's failure to allege sufficient facts to show the existence of a conspiracy. The law firm has submitted supporting affidavits of members of their law firm stating that they had no personal knowledge of

Mr. Alexander's application for law school registration, nor did they participate in the decision to deny his application.

In deciding the motion for summary judgment, this Court must view the material facts, and the inferences properly drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Alexander. Anderson at 255-56, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. Only the facts that may affect the outcome of the case under the governing law and which are necessary elements of the claim are "material." Id. Moreover, a factual dispute is "genuine" only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, Mr. Alexander. Id.

Plaintiff Alexander in order to show a conspiracy for the purpose of 42

U.S.C. Section 1985(2) must allege facts with sufficient specificity and factual support to suggest "a meeting of the minds": Manis v. Sterling, 862 F.2d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 1988). Mr. Alexander can avoid summary judgment only by showing that the facts and circumstances he has relied upon have attained "the dignity of substantial evidence and not be such as merely to create a suspicion." Metge v. Bachler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S. Ct. 798 (1986) (citations omitted). Mr. Alexander has devoted many pages in his supporting briefs to very specific allegations of wrongdoing by Evans & Dixon, which he alleges occurred in a prior proceeding. However, nothing in the pleadings or in Mr. Alexander's response to the motion for summary judgment supports the

inference of "an injury upon"
Mr. Alexander: Gometz v. Culwell, 850
F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted).

A "meeting of the minds" is a
material element in a conspiracy cause of
action: Manis, 862 F.2d at 681. Even
construing the factual allegations in
favor of Mr. Alexander, defendant
Evans & Dixon has met the burden of
showing that there was no conspiracy as
a matter of law, and that, therefore,
there was no genuine issue of material
fact.

When the moving party has met
their burden of showing that they are
entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law, the non-moving party,
Mr. Alexander, must "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Plaintiff Alexander need not definitively prove conspiracy between the members of the defendants in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Alexander need only show that his case is not so one-sided that the defendants must prevail as a matter of law.

Midwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Tampa Constructors, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 526, 529 (W.D. Mo. 1987). See also First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 1592-93 (1968). In making this determination, the plaintiff, as the non-moving party, must be given every benefit of the doubt. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge..."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513
(1986).

Mr. Alexander's conclusory statements have not shown the existence of an agreement between members of the Committee and Evans & Dixon to deny his application for law student registration. Mr. Alexander has failed to plead facts which, if assumed true, would support an inference that the alleged conspirators had reached "a meeting of the minds." Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted.

B. Conspiracy in Violation of 18
U.S.C. Section 241

Plaintiff Alexander also alleges that defendants conspired to deny him his constitutional right to practice law in

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 1063, 58 L. Ed. 2d 143, 131 S.

(1983).

Mr. Anderson's testimony

establishes that not when the relations

of an attorney between members of the

Committee and there is then the duty

the application for law student

registration. Mr. Anderson has failed

to point out which, if assumed true,

would support an inference that the

alleged conspiracy had occurred in

violation of the laws. Anderson's

claim for summary judgment must be

denied.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 1063, 58 L. Ed. 2d 143, 131 S.

Anderson's testimony also shows that

Anderson's testimony is not the only

evidence that is relevant to the

violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 241 (Supp. 1989). Defendant Evans & Dixon correctly note that this statute is a criminal statute, and thus that Mr. Alexander cannot pursue a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. Section 241.

C. Finality of Administrative Decision

Defendant Evans & Dixon moves in the alternative for dismissal based on Mr. Alexander's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because this Court is dismissing Mr. Alexander's case on other grounds, the finality of the administrative decision need not be addressed. This Court notes parenthetically, however, that Mr. Alexander's claim is not ripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.

Section 15 of the U.S.C. Section 15
(1909, 1911) Independent Senate & House
comparatively note that this statute is a
criminal statute, and that the
in Alexander never before a private
case of crime under the U.S.C. Section
15.

Section 15 of the U.S.C. Section 15
Independent Senate & House
the information for the Senate & House
the statute's failure to be passed
constitutional provisions. Section 15
and is therefore the Senate's law
in other words, the Senate is the
constitutional body, and the
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the Senate's power to pass laws
the Senate's power to pass laws

172, 186-194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3116-120

(1985). The Supreme Court in Williamson County stated the rule of law that a claim is premature until all administrative procedures have been exhausted and a final administrative decision has been reached.

Missouri Supreme Court Rule 8.12 provides that an applicant who has been denied law student registration can request a hearing before the Board. rule 8.12 further provides that this final decision of the Board may then be appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. Mr. Alexander has not submitted the required information for a hearing before the Board, and has not appealed that final decision to the Missouri Supreme Court. He does not yet have a final decision from which to take his appeal. His claim is, therefore, not yet ripe

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under Williamson County for adjudication by this Court.

D. Judicial Immunity

Defendant members of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee also have moved for dismissal of Mr. Alexander's claim based on their judicial immunity. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.27 provides that the Committee "shall be considered as acting under the authority of (the Missouri Supreme Court), and as such shall be...protected and be free from suits and judgments for damages." Committee members evaluating the fitness of those applying for law student registration to take the bar examination are, therefore, entitled to judicial immunity. Accord

under this name for the purpose

of this Court

and

to the Court

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Childs v. Reynoldson, 777 F.2d 1305
(8th Cir. 1985). Therefore, dismissal as
to defendant Committee is appropriate.

E. Failure to State Factual Allegations
to Support Claim

Defendant law firm Evans & Dixon
and defendant members of the Committee
also claim that they are entitled to
dismissal based on plaintiff Alexander's
failure to state sufficient factual
allegations to support a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Under Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure a complaint must contain a
"short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." The complaint must provide the
defendants with fair notice of what the

United States Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management
Washington, D. C. 20250

1. Failure to file a valid claim for
the land within the time specified
in the notice of the Department
and the failure to pay the required
fees within the time specified
in the notice of the Department
shall constitute a failure to
comply with the requirements of
the Act and the regulations thereunder.
2. The Department may, at its
discretion, extend the time for
filing a claim or for payment of
fees, but such extension shall not
be granted unless the applicant
shows good cause therefor.

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests: 5 C. Wright & A. Miller; Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1202 (1969). Some courts have set a higher standard of specificity for civil rights complaints because of their complexity: United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Gometz v. Culwell, 850 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1988); see generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 1281, at 364-65 (1969). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a cause of action: Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (8th Cir. 1980).

Mr. Alexander has not affirmatively supported his general and conclusory allegations that the Board, Committee, and members of the law firm of Evans &

Dixon engaged in a conspiracy. He alleges only that all defendants have a retaliatory motive for such conspiracy. Nothing in the documents submitted by the parties in the case at bar suggests that the defendants reached an agreement of any kind to prevent approval of Mr. Alexander's application for law student registration.

Neither has Mr. Alexander been able to show even the suggestion of an overt act by Evans & Dixon that resulted in denial of his application for law student registration. An overt act which results in injury is a principal element of conspiracy. Gomez, 850 F.2d at 464.

Dismissal of Mr. Alexander's complaint for failure to plead facts in support of his allegations of conspiracy is appropriate.

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F. Rule 11 Sanctions

Defendants Evans & Dixon and members of the Committee also pray for sanctions against plaintiff Alexander in the form of recovery of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11 provides that the party who signs a pleading must have knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, that the pleading is "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law..." One who signs a pleading in violation of this rule is subject to sanctions, which may include costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The standard for evaluating whether a pleading is subject to Rule 11 sanctions is an objective one. Lane v.

Peterson, 851 F.2d 193, 198 (8th Cir. 1988).

Mr. Alexander's complaint is legally unreasonable and is without factual basis whatsoever. Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate for a filing such as Mr. Alexander's, which is obviously devoid of merit under any objective standard. 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas, G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice para. 11.02(3), at 11-20 (2d Ed. 1989).

CONCLUSION

Mr. Alexander has pled no facts which, if assumed true, would support an inference that the alleged conspirators had reached a "meeting of the minds" sufficient to support a cause of action for conspiracy. Summary judgment and, in the alternative, dismissal for failure to state a claim, is

February 20, 1901. Mr. J. H. ...

Dear Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst.

in relation to the matter of the ...

and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Yours very truly,

Wm. H. ...

Enclosed for you are ...

Very respectfully,

Wm. H. ...

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the appropriate remedy for a meritless complaint. Also appropriate are Rule 11 sanctions for filing of a complaint in bad faith. Imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Alexander will achieve the goals of avoidance of frivolous suits and abuses of the legal system.

Therefore, in accordance with the above reasoning, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motions of defendant Evans & Dixon and defendant Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee for Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff Donald K. Alexander for costs and reasonable attorneys, fees incurred in proceeding on this suit is granted. It is further

ORDERED that the attorneys of record representing the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar Committee and the law firm of Evans & Dixon submit to this

Court on or before February 21, 1990, documentation on the amount of expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in this proceeding. It is further

ORDERED that defendant Evans & Dixon law firm's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 shall be stayed pending completion of the proceedings on the Rule 11 sanctions. It is further

ORDERED that the motion in the alternative of defendant Evans & Dixon for dismissal for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 241, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is stayed pending completion of the proceedings on the Rule 11 sanctions. It is further

ORDERED that the motion of defendant Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Bar

1864. It was the first time that the

people of the South had been

allowed to vote in the election

of 1864. It was a great

event in the history of the

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of the South had been allowed

to vote in the election of 1864.

Committee for dismissal for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(b) and 18 U.S.C. Section 241, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), is stayed pending completion of the proceedings on the Rule 11 sanctions.

SCOTT O. WRIGHT
United States District Judge

February 13, 1990.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-1477WM

Donald K. Alexander, *

Appellant *

v. *

Evans & Dixon Law * Appeal from

Firm; Richard K. * the United

Andrews; Gerre S. * States

Langton; David P. * District

Macoubrie; John L. * Court for

Oliver, Jr.; Lori * the Western

J. Levine; Loramel * District

P. Shurtleff; Thomas * of Missouri.

M. Dunlap; Bruce *

Beckett; Betty K. * (UNPUBLISHED)

Wilson; and Nancy *

Galloway, *

Appellees.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Vol. 90-1411W

Donald E. Alexander,

Appellant

vs. James S. Brown, Jr.,

Respondent

Appellee

James S. Brown, Jr.,

Respondent

vs. Donald E. Alexander,

Appellant

Appellee

James S. Brown, Jr.,

Respondent

vs. Donald E. Alexander,

Appellant

Appellee

Submitted: August 23, 1990

Filed: October 11, 1990

Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
HEANY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
FAGG, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIUM.

We have reviewed the record in
no. 90-1477. We conclude this
is a frivolous appeal and
summarily affirm the District
Court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
Because this appeal merely
continues Alexander's efforts
to harass the appellees, we impose
on Alexander damages of \$500.00
and double costs. See Fed. R.
App. P. 38.

A true copy,

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT.